Старуха с косой просится в гости к Вестингаузу

Цитата: Dobryаk от 29.01.2017 17:38:22Toshiba не будет брать новых заказов на строительство атомных блоков - Kyodo


AtomInfo.Ru, ОПУБЛИКОВАНО 29.01.2017

Корпорация "Toshiba" не станет брать новых заказов на строительство атомных энергоблоков, передаёт "Kyodo" со ссылкой на источники.
Такое решение фактически означает выход корпорации из бизнеса по строительству АЭС.

В дальнейшем корпорация намерена сосредоточиться на обслуживании действующих блоков (примечание: сюда входят поставки топлива!) и выводе блоков из эксплуатации.

Агентство отмечает, что работа по строительству четырёх блоков с AP-1000 в США будет, тем не менее, продолжена.

Ранее сообщалось, что 14 февраля 2017 года в корпорации "Toshiba" могут состояться отставки топ-менеджеров, вызванные крупными финансовыми потерями в атомном бизнесе.

"Toshiba" располагает собственным проектом водяного кипящего реактора ABWR, оставшимся со времён сотрудничества корпорации с американской "General Electric". Спрос в мире на кипящую технологию после аварии на Фукусиме практически отсутствует.

Из сообщения агентства не понятна судьба технологии AP-1000. Корпорация "Toshiba" - мажоритарный владелец компании "Westinghouse". Из сообщения нельзя заключить, распространяется ли отказ корпорации от новых проектов на проекты по сооружению блоков с AP-1000.

Цитата: Dobryаk от 29.01.2017 17:38:22

 

Я правильно понимаю, что укров просто кинули с засранными реакторами после экспериментов вестингауза?

• +1.11 / 31

Цитата: Советчик от 29.01.2017 20:02:31Я правильно понимаю, что укров просто кинули с засранными реакторами после экспериментов вестингауза?

Цитата: Советчик от 29.01.2017 20:02:31

 

Вы опережаете время

• +1.28 / 20

Цитата: Dobryаk от 29.01.2017 17:38:22Вводная: ядерное сообщество затаило дыхание в ожидании, кому же Тосиба сбагрит Вестингауз.

Цитата: Dobryаk от 29.01.2017 17:38:22

 

В развитие темы:

http://www.forbes.co…65a8f67b0a

Тосиба скорее всего положит болт на строительство ядерных блоков Вестингауза


В этой фразу вся суть обзора пробеомы в Forbes. Переводить нет времени.











Rod Adams ,  
Contributor
I focus on energy through an atomic lens. Tech, politics, competition.  
Opinions expressed by Forbes Contributors are their own.

Westinghouse is "unlikely to carry out actual construction work for the future nuclear power plant projects to eliminate risk."
Satoshi Tsunakawa, President and CEO of Toshiba, the Japanese company that owns Westinghouse and its CB&I Stone Webster subsidiary, made that statement during a recent press conference. The event, held on January 27, was called to provide a status report for restructuring actions first announced on December 27, 2016.
Computing Magnitude Of Lost Goodwill
The restructuring is required as a result of the growing realization that the value of Westinghouse's CB&I Stone and Webster subsidiary is probably several hundred billion yen (several billion dollars) less than its current book value. Adjusting the company's stated value with its real value will require taking a write off of "goodwill."
The reduction in goodwill value is based on CB&I's existing and predicted future liabilities associated with completing four nuclear plant construction projects, two at Plant Vogtle in northeast Georgia and two at the V.C. Summer site in northwest South Carolina. This is an excerpt from the company's Jan 27 press release.
Determination of the goodwill requires verification of enormous data and considerable time for scrutiny. Given this, Toshiba will announce the goodwill and others, and its earnings result for the third quarter of FY2016, on February 14th, 2017, the deadline for submission of the quarterly report. In the earnings announcement, Toshiba will explain the impact of the current issue, its causes and countermeasures, and the revised forecast for the full fiscal year.
Midori Hara, a spokesperson from Toshiba's Public Relations office, stated via email that "we are reviewing future of our nuclear power business outside Japan, but nothing has been decided at this time."
During the Jan 27 press conference Mr. Tsunakawa said that the restricting solution may include a move to separate the "nuclear business from the Energy Systems and Solutions Company, and position it as an organization directly under the control of the President and CEO, as a measure to strengthen risk management. This will allow smoother reporting and decision-making and promote more information sharing, and also support us in our goal of securing stronger management of U.S. nuclear project costs and enhanced governance of Westinghouse."
Hara deferred any comment on the fate of Danny Roderick, President and CEO of Toshiba's Energy Systems & Solutions Company.
We cannot comment on the responsibility of Danny Roderick at this moment as well.
Hara's email also explained the preliminary understanding of root cause of the company's current financial stress.
Initially, the construction for the U.S. two projects were carried out by CB&I by its subsidiary called Stone & Webster, however, since there were disputes related to cost increase from change in NRC’s regulation, Westinghouse acquired Stone & Webster in 2015 that resolved all the disputes and moved on for construction.
This acquisition is becoming the issue now, which Toshiba has announced on Dec. 27 2016, that it could result in making several billion US dollar loss (write-down).
(Emphasis added.)
More Liability Than Expected
A reasonable translation of that statement is that Westinghouse determined that disputes about project costs and determining who would pay for them threatened to halt construction. To avoid that situation, Westinghouse purchased the construction company so it could move forward.
That put Toshiba – through Westinghouse and CB&I Stone and Webster – on the hook for all project construction costs beyond the agreed contract price.
Though there is plenty of blame to go around for the cost overruns, several major regulatory changes have been significant drivers. Some of those decisions are so far in the past that they have been largely forgotten.
Major Impact From NRC Imposition Of Aircraft Impact Rule
One of those changes happened more than a decade ago, soon after the contracts were signed for the four AP1000 units currently under construction. The NRC determined that all reactors whose construction had not already started would be required to meet the newly issued Aircraft Impact Rule.
That decision, which regulators apparently justified based on a belief that design changes before construction actually starts are cheap, inserted an unexpectedly large uncertainty into the project. The contract terms, pricing and schedule were based on the design that had received NRC certification in May 2006.
The design revisions required to meet the Aircraft Rule changes involved at least three more design revisions that did not get final approval until Jan 2012. Completely different construction techniques needed to be invented, tested, litigated and approved.
No reasonable and experienced construction estimator would fail to recognize the impact on project costs and schedules resulting from such a major change. Unfortunately, there were apparently few such people involved in the high level contract negotiations, corporate strategic decisions and in the public communications effort.
Don't Know Who Is Going To Pay The Bill
The project's utility company customers, pressured by their public utility commissions and the antinuclear activists who are always ready to point fingers, have held fast to their firm-priced contracts. They have held their suppliers responsible for the delays and cost increases. Not surprisingly, COL holders are reluctant to push too hard in public to convince the NRC to accept its share of responsibility for the delays.
COL holders know that they will have to deal with NRC regulators for many decades after the vendors' work is complete. Pointedly criticizing regulators that have the power to halt operations and revenue generation is a risky path to take.
Unfortunately, vendors don't have a customer base or an adjustable revenue stream that can prevent financial collapse in the event of a large and growing construction project liability. Even a white knight would be challenged in any attempt to resolve disputes and finish the project.
Without some immediate efforts to forthrightly explain the reasons that the first new U.S. nuclear plants in more than 30 years have been delayed and cost more than initially agreed upon in early 2006, it appears likely that they will become both the first and last of a kind.
There is even a significant possibility that the projects will fail to be completed at all. Parties that are pointing fingers have a hard time operating cranes and welding torches.


Вдогонку:   на Атоминфо опперативно появился разбор материала,  который я не захотел переводить, да вдобавок еще и с дополнениями:

Цитата: ЦитатаToshiba и Westinghouse ищут выход


AtomInfo.Ru, ОПУБЛИКОВАНО 29.01.2017

Корпорация "Toshiba" может отказаться от строительства новых атомных блоков. Вслед за японской корпорацией аналогичное решение может принять и принадлежащая ей компания "Westinghouse".

Последствия решений

Туман вокруг дальнейших намерений "Toshiba" должен рассеяться 14 февраля 2017 года.В этот день могут уйти в отставку топ-менеджеры "Toshiba" и "Westinghouse", а также могут быть сделаны заявления программного характера - сразу после формального признания крупных финансовых потерь корпорации, вызванных деятельностью "Westinghouse".

Источники агентства "Kyodo" утверждают, что "Toshiba" не станет более брать новых заказов на строительство атомных энергоблоков. В свою очередь, "Westinghouse" не будет более выполнять работы по строительству атомных блоков, "чтобы избежать рисков". Об этом заявил президент "Toshiba" Сатоси Цуканава, а его, в свою очередь, процитировал американский отраслевой обозреватель Род Адамс в статье для "Forbes".

Адамс приводит комментарий, полученный им от японской корпорации, в котором объясняются причины столь резких изменений.

За строительство четырёх блоков с AP-1000 в США отвечала компания CB&I, купившая в 2013 году традиционного партнёра "Westinghouse" - компанию "Shaw". Между CB&I и "Westinghouse" возникли разногласия по стоимости строительства. В результате, "Westinghouse" пришлось в 2015 году выкупить у CB&I подразделение, занимающееся атомным строительством - "CB&I Stone and Webster Inc.".

В корпорации "Toshiba" возникшие разногласия относят за счёт изменившихся требований NRC. Род Адамс предполагает, что речь может идти о норме "Aircraft Impact Rule", касающейся падения самолёта, её принятие обошлось "Westinghouse" в три последовательных ревизии проекта AP-1000.

На этом проблемы не закончились. В результате данной покупки "Toshiba" понесла убытки в размере "нескольких миллиардов долларов". Теперь японская корпорация определяется с дальнейшими действиями - ожидаются отставки и громкие заявления.

Возможные варианты

Возможный отказ "Toshiba" и "Westinghouse" от участия в новом строительстве не обязательно равносилен закату эры технологии AP-1000. Но такой отказ, если он будет оформлен официально, означает, что компании "Westinghouse" придётся подыскивать партнёра или партнёров на стороне для реализации новых проектов.


Из всех возможных предложений по строительству блоков с AP-1000 наиболее реальными сегодня выглядят проекты в Индии и Великобритании. Если индийские атомщики только обрадуются сложному положению, в котором оказался "Westinghouse", и сразу предложат свои услуги, то в Великобритании всё выглядит не так однозначно.

Но есть иной вариант, активно обсуждаемый в последнее время в экспертных кругах. Корпорация "Toshiba" может продать свои акции "Westinghouse" новому владельцу, у которого может быть свой взгляд на возможности американской компании. Проблема в том, что очереди из желающих купить "Westinghouse" не наблюдается, или эта очередь хорошо укрыта от сторонних взглядов.

Среди тех, кто мог быть претендовать на покупку, наблюдатели называют японскую корпорацию MHI (примечание: Мицубиси) . Сложность, однако, в том, что MHI имеет партнёрские отношения с французами и даже пытается разрабатывать с ними проект легководного реактора ATMEA-1 поколения III+.

Ещё одна возможная кандидатура - компания KEPCO из Южной Кореи. Южнокорейские предприятия входят в число поставщиков для блоков с AP-1000. Кроме того, известно, что KEPCO ведёт переговоры о вхождении в состав инвесторов проекта по строительству в Великобритании АЭС "Мурсайд" с реакторами AP-1000.

Но у KEPCO имеется собственный успешный реакторный проект APR-1400, и неизвестно, нужен ли южнокорейской компании контроль над проектом-конкурентом. Стоит добавить также, что KEPCO предпочитает в ядерном бизнесе осторожность и не любит рискованных сделок, а покупка "Westinghouse", безусловно, будет именно таковой.

• +1.64 / 31

Цитата: Dobryаk от 30.01.2017 09:15:10В развитие темы:

http://www.forbes.co…65a8f67b0a

Тосиба скорее всего положит болт на строительство ядерных блоков Вестингауза
Вдогонку:   на Атоминфо опперативно появился разбор материала,  который я не захотел переводить, да вдобавок еще и с дополнениями:

Цитата: Dobryаk от 30.01.2017 09:15:10

 

Это как понимать?
типО Тошиба и Вестингауз одновременно вылетают  с глобального атомного рынка? Понятно, что не полностью, но число степеней свободы у них по отдельности упадет существенно. Хотя и раньше было ненамного больше....
Вот он, кровавый оскал капитализма, когда РУССКИЕ!! могут прицениться к народному американскому достоянию.....
Интересно, спецы куда побегут? В Китай, Индию или к нам?

• +0.48 / 11

Цитата: Dobryаk от 30.01.2017 09:15:10В развитие темы:

http://www.forbes.co…65a8f67b0a

Тосиба скорее всего положит болт на строительство ядерных блоков Вестингауза


В этой фразу вся суть обзора пробеомы в Forbes. Переводить нет времени.











Rod Adams ,  
Contributor
I focus on energy through an atomic lens. Tech, politics, competition.  
Opinions expressed by Forbes Contributors are their own.

Westinghouse is "unlikely to carry out actual construction work for the future nuclear power plant projects to eliminate risk."
Satoshi Tsunakawa, President and CEO of Toshiba, the Japanese company that owns Westinghouse and its CB&I Stone Webster subsidiary, made that statement during a recent press conference. The event, held on January 27, was called to provide a status report for restructuring actions first announced on December 27, 2016.
Computing Magnitude Of Lost Goodwill
The restructuring is required as a result of the growing realization that the value of Westinghouse's CB&I Stone and Webster subsidiary is probably several hundred billion yen (several billion dollars) less than its current book value. Adjusting the company's stated value with its real value will require taking a write off of "goodwill."
The reduction in goodwill value is based on CB&I's existing and predicted future liabilities associated with completing four nuclear plant construction projects, two at Plant Vogtle in northeast Georgia and two at the V.C. Summer site in northwest South Carolina. This is an excerpt from the company's Jan 27 press release.
Determination of the goodwill requires verification of enormous data and considerable time for scrutiny. Given this, Toshiba will announce the goodwill and others, and its earnings result for the third quarter of FY2016, on February 14th, 2017, the deadline for submission of the quarterly report. In the earnings announcement, Toshiba will explain the impact of the current issue, its causes and countermeasures, and the revised forecast for the full fiscal year.
Midori Hara, a spokesperson from Toshiba's Public Relations office, stated via email that "we are reviewing future of our nuclear power business outside Japan, but nothing has been decided at this time."
During the Jan 27 press conference Mr. Tsunakawa said that the restricting solution may include a move to separate the "nuclear business from the Energy Systems and Solutions Company, and position it as an organization directly under the control of the President and CEO, as a measure to strengthen risk management. This will allow smoother reporting and decision-making and promote more information sharing, and also support us in our goal of securing stronger management of U.S. nuclear project costs and enhanced governance of Westinghouse."
Hara deferred any comment on the fate of Danny Roderick, President and CEO of Toshiba's Energy Systems & Solutions Company.
We cannot comment on the responsibility of Danny Roderick at this moment as well.
Hara's email also explained the preliminary understanding of root cause of the company's current financial stress.
Initially, the construction for the U.S. two projects were carried out by CB&I by its subsidiary called Stone & Webster, however, since there were disputes related to cost increase from change in NRC’s regulation, Westinghouse acquired Stone & Webster in 2015 that resolved all the disputes and moved on for construction.
This acquisition is becoming the issue now, which Toshiba has announced on Dec. 27 2016, that it could result in making several billion US dollar loss (write-down).
(Emphasis added.)
More Liability Than Expected
A reasonable translation of that statement is that Westinghouse determined that disputes about project costs and determining who would pay for them threatened to halt construction. To avoid that situation, Westinghouse purchased the construction company so it could move forward.
That put Toshiba – through Westinghouse and CB&I Stone and Webster – on the hook for all project construction costs beyond the agreed contract price.
Though there is plenty of blame to go around for the cost overruns, several major regulatory changes have been significant drivers. Some of those decisions are so far in the past that they have been largely forgotten.
Major Impact From NRC Imposition Of Aircraft Impact Rule
One of those changes happened more than a decade ago, soon after the contracts were signed for the four AP1000 units currently under construction. The NRC determined that all reactors whose construction had not already started would be required to meet the newly issued Aircraft Impact Rule.
That decision, which regulators apparently justified based on a belief that design changes before construction actually starts are cheap, inserted an unexpectedly large uncertainty into the project. The contract terms, pricing and schedule were based on the design that had received NRC certification in May 2006.
The design revisions required to meet the Aircraft Rule changes involved at least three more design revisions that did not get final approval until Jan 2012. Completely different construction techniques needed to be invented, tested, litigated and approved.
No reasonable and experienced construction estimator would fail to recognize the impact on project costs and schedules resulting from such a major change. Unfortunately, there were apparently few such people involved in the high level contract negotiations, corporate strategic decisions and in the public communications effort.
Don't Know Who Is Going To Pay The Bill
The project's utility company customers, pressured by their public utility commissions and the antinuclear activists who are always ready to point fingers, have held fast to their firm-priced contracts. They have held their suppliers responsible for the delays and cost increases. Not surprisingly, COL holders are reluctant to push too hard in public to convince the NRC to accept its share of responsibility for the delays.
COL holders know that they will have to deal with NRC regulators for many decades after the vendors' work is complete. Pointedly criticizing regulators that have the power to halt operations and revenue generation is a risky path to take.
Unfortunately, vendors don't have a customer base or an adjustable revenue stream that can prevent financial collapse in the event of a large and growing construction project liability. Even a white knight would be challenged in any attempt to resolve disputes and finish the project.
Without some immediate efforts to forthrightly explain the reasons that the first new U.S. nuclear plants in more than 30 years have been delayed and cost more than initially agreed upon in early 2006, it appears likely that they will become both the first and last of a kind.
There is even a significant possibility that the projects will fail to be completed at all. Parties that are pointing fingers have a hard time operating cranes and welding torches.

Вдогонку:   на Атоминфо опперативно появился разбор материала,  который я не захотел переводить, да вдобавок еще и с дополнениями:

Цитата: Dobryаk от 30.01.2017 09:15:10

 

Помимо вестов на данный момент GE строит пару реакторов в Тайване. Плюс к этому GE заключила с Росатомом договор на строительство СП по фабрикации ТВС-Квадрат. По факту получается, что ядерная энергетика в США йок. Американские компании теряют компетенции в строительстве АЭС и производстве топлива для них.

• +0.40 / 13