Тред №863134

Цитата: Dobryаk от 19.12.2014 14:42:44И еще сплоченнее хором: ну чего это Россия кипятком на Третий энергопакет писает? Ну подумаешь, разве это ограничение?

Цитата: Dobryаk от 19.12.2014 14:42:44

 

ответь им: ДА, ЭТО ОГРАНИЧЕНИЕ, из за которого сейчас и Северный Поток заполнен ТОЛЬКО НАПОЛОВИНУ.

Что Газпром не может себе позволить сначала построить за свои кровные денежки (25 млрд между прочим!!!) трубу, чтобы потом её заполнение зависело от каких то чинуш из Брюсселя. Чтобы вместо своего газа продавать в ней чей то ещё, и терпеть убытки. Это не только не выгодно, это просто делает сам проект настолько рискованным, что не позволяет просчитать точку окупаемости -- проще плюнуть на эту вашу европу - покупайте газ параходами у ОАЕ и США за $750 и любитесь конем со своими энергопакетами
объясните им, что этот 3-й энергопакет не был изобретен ни для одного проекта в Европе. Ни для Норвегии не применялся, ни для африканской трубы, ни даже для собственно Северного Потока (правда под него попала уже германская труба "опал") -- нет, не было и не будет ни одной трубы, которая работала бы по "3-му энергопакету". Что это специально придумали еврочинуши. Что газпром не дурак и послал их лесом. 

переведите им эту статью http://pivopotam.liv…51429.html
хотя вот она собственно на английском http://vineyardsaker…south.html

Much of the anger that exists in the west towards Putin can be explained by European and western resentment at his refusal and that of the Russian government to the break up of Russia's energy monopolies and to the “opening up” (as it is euphemistically called) of the Russian energy industry to the advantage of western companies. Many of the allegations of corruption that are routinely made against Putin personally are intended to insinuate that he opposes the “opening up” of the Russian energy industry and the break up and privatisation of Gazprom and Rosneft because he has a personal stake in them (in the case of Gazprom, that he is actually its owner). If one examines in detail the specific allegations of corruption made against Putin (as I have done) this quickly becomes obvious. 


His agenda of forcing Russia to privatise and break up its energy monopolies has never gone away. This is why Gazprom, despite the vital and reliable service it provides to its European customers, comes in for so much criticism. When Europeans complain about Europe's energy dependence upon Russia, they express their resentment at having to buy gas from a single Russian state owned company (Gazprom) as opposed to their own western companies operating in Russia. 

This resentment exists simultaneously with a belief, very entrenched in Europe, that Russia is somehow dependent upon Europe as a customer for its gas and as a supplier of finance and technology. 

This combination of resentment and overconfidence is what lies behind the repeated European attempts to legislate in Europe on energy questions in a way that is intended to force Russia to “open up” its the energy industry there. 

The first attempt was the so-called Energy Charter, which Russia signed but ultimately refused to ratify. The latest attempt is the EU's so-called Third Energy Package. 

This is presented as a development of EU anti-competition and anti-monopoly law. In reality, as everyone knows, it is targeted at Gazprom, which is a monopoly, though obviously not a European one. 

This is the background to the conflict over South Stream. The EU authorities have insisted that South Stream must comply with the Third Energy Package even though the Third Energy Package came into existence only after the outline agreements for South Stream had been already reached. 

Compliance with the Third Energy Package would have meant that though Gazprom supplied the gas it could not own or control the pipeline through which gas was supplied. 

Were Gazprom to agree to this, it would acknowledge the EU’s authority over its operations. It would in that case undoubtedly face down the line more demands for more changes to its operating methods. Ultimately this would lead to demands for changes in the structure of the energy industry in Russia itself. 

What has just happened is that the Russians have said no. Rather than proceed with the project by submitting to European demands, which is what the Europeans expected, the Russians have to everyone’s astonishment instead pulled out of the whole project. 

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